My purpose in this study has been to trace the relationship of Marxism and existentialism as the dominant theme in recent French social thought. My thesis is that the two doctrines converged in Sartre and 'in the Arguments group, establishing the beginnings of a social theory of the New Left. Starting from the period right after World War II, when Marxism and existentialism were competing doctrines, I have described the movement of Sartre and his circle toward Marxism and the movement of Marxists away from Stalinism. By the mid-1960s there had been various attempts at a synthetic existential Marxism, all of which should be seen as tentative beginnings that might result in a major new social theory. In the final chapter, I test the new theory by using it to help us comprehend the events of May-June, 1968. Existential Marxism emerges as a social theory suited to comprehend the conditions and the contradictions of advanced industrial society, to articulate the situation of various groups in this society, and to provide a new kind of theory for the human sciences that sees the scientist not as value-free or objective but as implicated in the object of his knowledge. Existential Marxism might thus be considered both as the "ideology" of an emerging radical coalition and as a theoretical advance in its own right.

My disciplinary orientation is that of the history of ideas which describes changing intellectual patterns with more concern for the relation of ideas to society than for the

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logical consistency of the ideas themselves. Hence I have not attempted a systematic exposition of New Left social theory, but have restricted myself, with minor exceptions, to articulating the theories of the French. It will be clear to the reader that I am sympathetic to the effort of the existential Marxists, although I am not committed to any particular version of their thinking. I adhere to their commitment to a radical restructuring of relations and institutions in advanced industrial society, and I am especially convinced of the value of their efforts to redefine the nature of the human sciences. My study of their positions has challenged me to consider the limitations of intellectual history, but I have not deviated very far, in this work, from its traditional methodological boundaries. Finally, it is my hope that the study of the theoretical advances of the French will be of value to all those concerned about the present state of social theory in the human sciences and to all those in the United States who are beginning to confront their situation on a theoretical level.

I have been able to profit from the work of other scholars of recent French social theory. H. S. Hughes, The Obstructed Path (1968) covers the period from 1930 to 1960, ranging over the entire landscape of social thought. Walter Odajnyk, Marxism and Existentialism (1965) analyzes philosophically the relations of Stalinist Marxism and Sartre's early positions. George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (1966) illuminates Marxism at the level of political theory. Arnold Metzger, Existentialismus und Sozialismus: der Dialog des Zeitalters (1968) interrogates the two doctrines by looking at the German traditions of Martin Heidegger and Lebensphilosophie. Raymond Aron, Marxism and the Existentialists (1969) treats the French scene, and I have dealt with his views as part of my narrative. It should be stated that my study treats the convergence of Marxism and existentialism as both possible and necessary, whereas previous accounts have been either suspicious or hostile. Hence this study attempts to revise

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the current image of this period of French social theory from one of an obstructed path to one that accounts for openings into new directions. Instead of characterizing the period through the impasses and dead ends of Camus, Teilhard de Chardin, and others, as does Hughes, we will see that it was a period of profound reorientation and vitality in social theory.

For purposes of a provisional statement to help the reader orient himself as he proceeds, existential Marxism may be defined very loosely as follows: a non-Leninist Marxism that conceptualizes advanced industrial society in a way that points toward the possible elimination of its alienating structures; that looks to all the relations of daily life, not simply to relations of production, to make society intelligible; that picks up from existentialism the effort to capture human beings in the moment of their active creation of their world, in their subjectivity; and, finally, that rejects the attempt to have a closed theory complete within itself.

A fellowship from the University of California made it possible for me to visit Paris and speak with many French theorists. I want to note my thanks for their kind help and for their putting up with my French, such as it is. I spoke with the following people: Kostas Axelos, Jean Baudrillard, Bernard Besnier, Michel-Antoine Burnier, Cornélius Castoriadis, Michel Contat, Dominique Desanti, Jean-Marie Domenach, Joseph Gabel, Richard Gombin, André Gorz, Claude Lefort, Edgar Morin, Stanley Pullberg, and Pierre Vidal-Naquet. I want to mention also the colleagues and friends who argued with me about this study, who read parts of the manuscript and who gave me their criticisms and suggestions: Robert Anchor, Paul Breines, David Carroll, Peter Clecak, Jack Diggins, Alexander Gelley, Martin Jay, Frederic Jameson, James Miller, David Schalk, Jeremy Shapiro, Ricky Sherover, Shierry Weber, and Hayden White. In particular I want to thank Dick Howard for the enormous help be has freely given to me in working over

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the manuscript. Also, Jacqueline Doyle worked tirelessly to put me in touch with materials beyond the limited resources of Orange County. Finally, my family lived with me the ups and downs of this study and receive my thanks for their support and patience.

Laguna Beach, California

 
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